






Currency Market Reactions to Good and Bad News  















There is considerable disagreement among analysts about the extent to which the spread 
of the Asian crisis was based on reasonable changes in expectations about fundamentals 
versus pure contagion effects resulting from imperfections in the behavior of currency 
and financial markets. In this paper we focus specifically on the behavior of the foreign 
exchange market for the five Asian countries. We find little support for the hypothesis 
that the Asian currency crisis was dominated by panic in the markets such that investors 
and speculators reacted much more strongly to bad than to good news. While the 
strongest reactions were to home news, there were also a number of significant cross 
effects.  Almost all of these were of the same sign, suggesting that investors typically 
assumed that what was good for one country was good for all.  Again, there was no 
systematic evidence of stronger reactions to bad than to good news. The markets may 
have overreacted in general, pushing currencies below the levels justified by the 
fundamentals, but, if so, this did not undercut the markets ability to respond to good as 
well as bad news, nor do these responses appear to have been systematically smaller to 
good than to bad news. The symptoms of the blind panic that has so often been alleged do 
not appear in the data. 
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The recent rash of international financial crises has generated considerable interest in the 
behavior of international currency and financial markets, with the economist's traditional 
theory of efficient speculative behavior becoming increasingly challenged by views of 
rational or irrational herding effects, momentum trading, and excessive swings between 
optimistic and pessimistic moods in markets. There is considerable disagreement among 
analysts about the extent to which the spread of the Asian crisis was based on reasonable 
changes in expectations about fundamentals versus pure contagion effects resulting from 
imperfections in the behavior of currency and financial markets.
1 
 One popular view is that international investors and currency traders selectively 
filter information based on their basic moods or outlooks of optimism and pessimism. 
Such "confirmation bias" has been found in many aspects of human behavior.
2 Thus it is 
certainly a plausible hypothesis. For currency markets the implication is that in good 
times bad news will be heavily discounted relative to good news, while during crises or 
other times of pessimistic views, bad news will be weighted more heavily than good 
news.  
  Recent studies by Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) and Baig Goldfajn (1999) 
find some evidence of such asymmetric responses. Kaminsky and Schmukler test this 
hypothesis during the Asian crises for the days of largest changes in the dollar value of a 
set of nine Asian stock markets. They find a sizably stronger reaction to bad than to good 
                                                        
1 Compare, for example, Furman and Stiglitz (1998 ) Radalet and Sachs ( 1998 ) and Willett 
(2000). 
2 For discussion and reference to the literature on herding and other possible imperfection in the 
behavior of financial markets, see Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) Kim and Wei (1999) and 
Willett (2000).   3
news. Baig and Goldfajn look separately at the reactions of stock markets and exchange 
rates for five major crisis countries. In this paper we focus specifically on the behavior of 
the foreign exchange market for the same five countries. Our methodology is similar to 
Baig and Goldfajn but we use an expanded set of news events. Our time period ( from 
July 1997 to April 1998 ) also differs slightly from Baig and Goldfajn's ( from July 1997 
to May 1998 ). Baig and Goldfajn find significant effects of bad news for all five 
countries, but significant effects of good news for only three. In our sample, however, we 
find significant effects of both good and bad news for all countries. Furthermore we find 
no systematic pattern of higher coefficients for bad than good news. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the 
chronicles of Asian crises. Section 3 discusses the data sets and methodology 
incorporating dummy variables for bad and good news. Section 4 interprets the tests and 
discusses the evidence. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Brief Overview of the Asian Crisis Chronicle 
3 
Figure 1 plots the daily exchange rates in the five major Asian crises-suffered countries 
during the crisis period from January 1997 to June 1998.     
 During 1997 the pressures on the Thai baht increased as Thailand's largest finance 
company failed on May 23. Around the same time, Thailand's finance minister, Amnuay 
Viravan, who was strongly against devaluing the baht, resigned on June 19. On July 2, 
right after the announcement of "no devaluation" by the Prime Minister on June 30, the 
                                                        
 
3 For more detailed reviews see Goldstein (1998 ) Pempel (1999 ) and Willett (2000).   4
Bank of Thailand announced a floating system of the baht and called on the International 
Monetary Fund for assistance.  
 As the Thai baht's depreciation began to affect ASEAN currencies, other South 
East Asian countries abandoned their currency defenses and adopted more flexible 
exchange rate policies. The Philippines allowed a wider float range for the peso against 
the dollar on July 11, and Indonesia widened its rupiah trading band on July 11 and 
started to float the rupiah in August 14. Also, Malaysia announced the abandonment of its 
defense of the ringitt on July 14.  
 By August 1997, the absence of strong steady policy responses by the 
governments of the crisis countries was contributing to greater uncertainty for investors. 
Some statements of political leaders further provoked the uncertainty and concern in the 
capital market. For example, after Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bitterly attacked 
"rogue speculators", the Malaysian ringgit fell further.  
 In October 1997, the devaluation of the Taiwan dollar further scared investors in 
Asian markets. Because of the high linkage and similarity between Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, the devaluation of the Taiwan dollar created doubt about whether the Hong Kong 
peg to the U.S dollar would be changed. Consequently, on October 23, one week after the 
devaluation of the Taiwan dollar, the Hong Kong Hang Seng stock market index crashed 
by 30 percent, more severely than the 1987 crash.  
At this point, international investors started to reassess the situation in Korea 
where several of the largest conglomerates went into financial turmoil after Hanbo Steel 
company collapsed in January. The Korean government delayed the decision to handle 
the financial trouble of Kia Motor Group until October 22. Along with the presidential   5
election campaign, former president Kim Young-Sam was bitterly attacked by the 
opposition party for the suspicious connection between his son and the collapsed Hanbo 
Steel company. The government failed to pass the Financial Reform Bill on November 18 
because of the opposition party's rejection, which further lowered confidence in capital 
markets. Also, in November, global investors became frightened by the news that 
international rating agencies were downgrading Korea's foreign debt which was 
estimated at more than $100 billion, with short-term debt estimated at 80% of the total. 
Consequently, the Korean government announced on November 21 that it would seek an 
IMF rescue package. In addition, Japan's troubled financial sector deepened the crisis in 
Korea. For example, Japan's fourth-largest brokerage, Yamaichi Securities, announced 
that it would shut down on November 24. The Finance and Economic Ministry in Korea 
reported that the Japanese banks withdrew about 8 billion dollars of the 14 billion dollars 
withdrawn by foreign banks during October and November 1997. 
  On January 6 of 1998, the Indonesian government announced an expansionary 
budget, which violated the terms of their IMF program. This led the rupiah to collapse to 
more than 10,000 from about 7000 within two days. By the late-January 1998, the Asian 
financial crisis had began to calm down as the U.S. pledged to pressure international 
commercial banks to roll over Korea's short term debt. On January 16 of 1998, Korea and 
international banks completed the agreement to roll over much of the short-term debt of 
Korea. The Indonesia rupiah seemed to start to rally after the news that the Indonesian 
government signed the second agreement to accept IMF reform program on January 15, 
1998. Indonesia announced new reforms on January 27 designed to restore confidence in 
its banking sector, guaranteeing commercial bank obligations and allowing overseas   6
investment in local banks. However, political instability and riots, and Indonesian 
president Suharto's plan to implement a Currency Board system, made the crisis persist 
longer in Indonesia than in other Asian emerging economies. 
 
( figure 1 about here ) 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
We construct dummy variables for important news of fundamentals and policy changes 
during the Asian financial crisis period, following the methodology used in Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (1999) and Baig and Goldfajin (1999). We use daily data on changes in 
exchange rates against dollar in the crisis-affected countries as the dependent variable. 
The source of daily exchange rate data is the 'Pacific Exchange Rate Service' at the 
University of British Columbia. In addition to dummy variables, following Baig and 
Goldfajn, the Yen/Dollar exchange rate and U.S. Stock Market Index (daily NYSE) were 
included as explanatory variables to account for common external shocks in currency 
markets.  
The sources of market news are “Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis and its 
Global Contagion” from the Roubini's Asian crisis web site, and "Chronology of the 
Asian Economic Crisis" from the web site of the University of Virginia, in which they 
collected information from several news sources (Reuters, Wall Street Journal, New York 
Times, CNNfn, Financial Times, Bloomberg, etc.).
4 We also collected news from 
newspaper summaries prepared by Asia Pulse, and we checked the appendix in Baig and 
                                                        
4 See http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia, and 
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~teb7c/asianchronology.   7
Goldfajn (1998)’s paper and Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999)'s paper. Compared with 
the sample of news reports used in Baig and Goldfajn (1999), from July 1997 to April 
1998 seventy four additional or different news reports are used in this paper.
5  
We classify the daily news releases according to the country of origin, and 
according to the categories of bad news and good news. For news already included in 
Baig and Goldfajn (1999) or Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999)'s paper, we followed their 
coding of good and bad news. For additional news events included in this paper, we 
followed the criteria delineated by Baig and Goldfajn: We classified as good news, 
reports of financial aid agreements, credible economic reforms, the upgrade of credit 
ratings, the removal of capital controls, good economic indicators ( such as lower 
inflation rate, rising stock market index, trade surplus etc., ), news forecasting a better 
economic outlook and political stability: We classified as bad news, reports indicating 
conflicts with international organizations, financial troubles or bankruptcies of firms, 
non-credible economic reforms, the downgrade of credit ratings, the imposition of capital 
controls, worse than expected economic indicators ( such as higher inflation rate, 
crashing stock market index, etc., ) and political instability. Where the effects seemed to 
likely to be unclear we excluded the event. 
Under the hypothesis of herding panic, investors may show significantly 
asymmetric responses to "bad news" and "good news" about fundamentals as the crisis 
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5 The chronology of the daily news releases used for dummy variables is available from the 
authors on request. 
   8
where EX is the change of daily exchange rates, GN
i is a dummy variable for domestic 
"good news", BN
i is a dummy variable for domestic "bad news", and FN are other 
economic variables, specifically the U.S. stock market index and Yen/US dollars. These 
dummy variables take a value of 1 for good news or for bad news, and zero if there is no 
news of that type during a specific day. 
  Our initial analysis is only for news about the home country. However, for 
questions of herding behavior and contagion we might expect there to be more 
asymmetry in the response in the home currency to news about other countries in the 






j is a dummy variable for foreign "good news", and BN
j is a dummy variable 
for foreign "bad news". According to our data set, for only 68 out of 209 days there were 
neither domestic own news nor foreign news that could be classified as clearly good or 
bad. 
 
4. Tests  
Our findings differ from those of Baig and Goldfajn in several respects. As 
reported in Table 1, we do not find significant effects for the control variables ( the US 
stock market index and the dollar/yen exchange rate ) as they did but we do find 
significant effects of both good news and bad news for all five countries. These results 































control. We also do not find any systematic pattern of differences in the size of the 
coefficients on bad versus good news. The good news coefficient is higher than for bad 
news for Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia and lower for Korea and the Philippines. The 
only case of substantial difference in the coefficients is for the Philippines, where the bad 
news coefficient is almost three times as large as for good news, and this is the only case 
where the differences are statistically significant.
6  Across countries, the estimated 
coefficients are remarkably similar in size, typically being in the range of 0.01 to 0.02, 
with the exception of Indonesia where the coefficients for both good and bad news are 
substantially higher. This ordering is consistent with our qualitative assessment that there 
was more big news concerning Indonesia.  
There were two cases where good and bad news arrive together in the data set. 
One case is for Korea on December 24, 1997 and the other is for Indonesia on January 
15, 1998. Despite the possibility that there could be no change in the currency value since 
two types of news are already reflected, the Korea won appreciated and the Indonesia 
rupiah depreciated. This seems to be because the importance of one type of the news 
dominated that of the other type of the news. For this reason, we used 0, 1, 2, 3 scheme 
instead of 0 or 1 dummy variables for the news, where 0 is no news, 1 is not much 
important, 2 is normally important, and 3 is very important. As reported in table 2, we 
still find the consistent pattern of home country news effects although the coefficients for 
good and bad news declined in all five countries. 
 The addition of the foreign news variables reported in table 3 does not 
substantially alter the pattern of home country news effects. The main difference is that 
                                                        
6 The Wald test statistic for differences in the coefficients is 4.99. This is significant at the five 
percent level. None of the other differences are close to conventional levels of significance.   10
the coefficient for good news in the Philippines falls by roughly half and loses its 
significance. 
 We find considerable evidence of significant home country effects of news about 
other countries in the region. Of 20 possible cases we find foreign news to be significant 
in 12. As we would expect the coefficients on foreign news are generally much lower 
than the coefficients on home country news. The exceptions are the effects of good news 
in Indonesia on the Malaysian ringgit, the effects of good news in Korea on the Indonesia 
rupiah and the effects of bad news in Malaysia on the Philippines peso. Again, there is no 
systemic pattern of bad news being more frequently significant or having larger 
coefficients than good news. In deed, of the fourteen cross effects estimated to be 
significant, nine are for good news. The only country with more significant cross effects 
for bad than good news is Malaysia, with effects of good news on Thailand and bad news 
on the Philippines and Indonesia. With the single exception of the effects of good news in 
Korea on Malaysia, all of the significant coefficients had the same sign for the cross 
effects as for the home effect.  This is consistent with the view that many investors 
looked at the region as a whole so that good news for one country was frequently taken as 
good news for all.  The exception to this pattern is Korea which was little affected by 
news in the other four countries.  This independence was asymmetric, however, with 
news in Korea frequently having effects on the other four.  Again, however there is no 
systematic pattern of larger effects from bad than from good. 
   
( tables 1, 2 and 3 about here ) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In coding the news for good news and bad news none of the studies to date ( including 
ours ) has tried to take account of the likely importance of events reported. Thus in a 
small sample it is quite possible that there could be sizable differences between the 
average importance of the good and bad news for some countries. Despite this possibility, 
however, we find little support for the hypothesis that the Asian currency crisis was 
dominated by panic in the markets such that investors and speculators reacted much more 
strongly to bad than to good news. As would be expected news has bigger effects on the 
home country than on others, but we do find a good deal of evidence of significant cross 
effects.  These are almost always of the same sign, suggesting that investors viewed these 
countries as a group with good or bad news for one being good or bad for all. On this 
score, however, Korea appears to have been seen as more independent.  Again, there is 
no systematic evidence of stronger reactions to bad than to good news. 
The markets may have overreacted in general, pushing currencies below the levels 
justified by the fundamentals, but, if so, this did not undercut the markets ability to 
respond to good as well as bad news, nor do these responses appear to have been 
systematically smaller to good than to bad news. The symptoms of the blind panic that 
has so often been alleged do not appear in the data.
7 
                                                        
7 A telling point that more than financial market panic was at work was there strong speculative 
pressure against the Korean won did not start until several months after the fall of the Thai baht.    12
APPENDIX 
07-02: After several weeks of speculative attacks, The Bank of Thailand 
announces a managed float of the baht and calls on the International 
Monetary Fund for “technical assistance". 
07-11: The Philippines central bank says in a statement it will allow the 
peso to move in a wider range against the dollar 
07-11: Indonesia widen its rupiah trading band to twelve from eight 
percent. 
*07-14: The Malaysian central bank abandons the defense of the ringitt. 
*07-15: The South Korean Kia Group's financial troubles arose. 
07-23: Non-performing loans of the 13 Thailand commercial banks 
(excluding the Bangkok Bank of Commerce and the Union Bank of 
Bangkok) average 8 percent of assets, ranging from 4 percent for 
Bangkok Bank to 10.5 percent for Krung Thai Bank. 
*07-23: S&P and Moody give several Korean banks a negative credit 
rating outlook. 
07-24: Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad launches bitter 
attack on “rogue speculators.” 
07-25: In Japan, Former chairman of Dai-Ichi is indicted on charges that 
he made loans totalling 11.78 billions yen to a suspected corporate 
racketeer   13
08-10: Payoff scandal in Japan widens as Yamaichi Securities, the 
nation’s third largest financial company, forces its top board members to 
resign. 
08-11: Contradictory statements about the appropriate level of the 
Ringitt made by the Malaysian PM and bank officials. 
08-14: Indonesian analysts raise grave concerns about unhedged dollar 
exposures of domestic corporations. The central bank abolishes its 
system of managing the exchange rate through the use of a band and 
allows it to float. 
08-22: Thailand’s $23.4 billion outstanding forward currency contracts 
surprises most market analysts. 
08-22: Daiwa Securities, the second largest brokerage company in 
Japan, says that it is also being investigated in the payoff scandal. 
08-24: Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad blames U.S. financier George 
Soros for leading attack on East Asian currencies: “All these countries 
have spent 40 years trying to build up their economies and a moron like 
Soros comes along.” 
*08-25: Standard & Poor may cut ratings for Thailand sovereign debt. 
*08-28: Tighter credit as reserve requirements rise in Malaysia. 
08-28: Leading international financial firms say that they will pull back 
substantially from Thailand in response to new capital control measures 
imposed by the Ministry of Finance.  
*09-03: Trading restrictions have been imposed in Malaysia   14
09-04: Several multi-billion dollar projects delayed or canceled in 
Malaysia. 
*09-08: Deregulation package (including cuts in government spending) 
will help bring down interest rate. 
09-10: Bank Indonesia reduces one-month interest rates by 2 percentage 
points to 25 percent. 
09-12: Moody’s Investors Service analyst said that up to five unidentified 
banks may fail in Thailand because of their problems. 
09-12: Hokkaido Bank and Hokkaido Takyshoku Bank of Japan 
postpone their planned merger until the huge bad loan problems of the 
respective banks are sorted out. 
*09-09: Jinro (19th largest chaebol in Korea ) becomes the third large 
Korean firm to go bankrupt with debts of nearly $3 billion. 
*09-16: IMF reported to be dissatisfied with progress in Thailand and 
threatens to withhold remaining rescue loan package if it does not 
implement necessary policies. 
09-17: Standard & Poor’s downgrades seven financial institutions in 
Thailand. 
09-17: Five current and former employees of Yamaichi Securities 
Company are arrested on illegal payoff charges in Japan. Yamaichi is 
also banned from under-writing Government bonds. 
*09-18: Concern that loan defaults and political tension could cause an 
outflow of investment in the Philippines.   15
*09-20: PM Mahathir tells delegates to IMF-World Bank conference in 
Hong Kong that currency trading is immoral; should be stopped. 
09-24: Arrests and resignations of current and former officials of Daiwa 
and Yamaichi Securities continue in Japan. 
09-25: Indonesian Social Minister Inten Suweno says the death toll from 
famine and a cholera outbreak in Indonesia’s remote Irian Jaya province 
has risen to 271. 
09-25: Office of Nikko Securities in are raided in connection with the 
payoff scandal in Japan. 
09-29: Thailand will raise value added tax (VAT) for most water and 
phone services. 
10-01: Malaysia’s PM Mahathir repeats his call for tighter regulation, or a 
total ban, on forex trading. 
10-03: Nikko Securities chairman and six other officials resign over the 
payoff scandal in Japan. 
10-06: Bank of Japan releases survey indicating that bank managers 
have turned more pessimistic. The survey results are worse than 
expected. 
*10-14: Devaluation of the Taiwan dollar. 
10-16: The Bank of Thailand revises downward its growth forecast for 
1997 from 2.5 percent to 1 percent. 
10-20: The five biggest banks in Thailand report third-quarter profit 
declines ranging from 13 percent at Siam Commercial Bank to 86   16
percent at Krung Thai Bank. Thai Finance Minister, Thanong Bidaya, 
announces that he would resign. 
*10-21 : The Hong Kong stock market crash by the Hang Seng index 
23.34 percent down. 
10-22: The Indonesian central bank prepares a list of troubled banks 
that will be liquidated as part of a bailout plan. 
10-22: In Japan, LDP’s package to jump-start the economy falls short of 
expectations 
10-23: The Big 4 securities houses of Japan, Daiwa, Yamaichi, Nikko, 
and Nomura Securities, report lower profits and falling commission for 
the first half of the 97-98 fiscal year. 
10-27: The payoff scandal in Japan grows as Hitachi admits that ten of 
its employees paid money to racketeers. 
10-29: Thailand’s Prime Minister’s own party members and coalition 
partners threaten rebellion if he does not make some changes to the 
cabinet by November 5. 
10-29: The Ministry of Finance in Japan suspends Daiwa from bidding 
and underwriting Govt. Bonds. 
11-04: Indonesia’s President Suharto’s second son Bambamg 
Trihatmodjo, owner of 25 percent of Bank Andromeda, promises to take 
legal action against the government after his proposal to inject 350 
billion rupiah into the bank is rejected.   17
11-06: Traders said the dollar rise versus the won reflected the U. S. 
currency’s strength versus the yen. ‘The dollar’s sharp rise against the 
Japanese yen in global trade boosted the U.S. currency against the won 
in Korea,’ said a dealer at Seoul Bank. In addition, dealers said 
sentiment about South Korea is negative, based on media reports in the 
Western press stating that South Korea’s economic crisis is set to get 
worse. 
*11-07: Stocks drop on concern that currency may weaken if Korean 
Won continues to depreciate. 
11-07: In Indonesia; sources claim that the Minister of Finance has 
resigned as a consequence of the legal action taken by Bank Andromeda. 
11-11: The private sector in Thailand faces about $16 billion worth of 
maturing foreign debts in the next 14 months, of which cash-strapped 
Thai corporate borrowers would need to roll over at least an estimated 
$6.0 billion. 
11-12: Analysts express concern about Japan’s banking sector 
difficulties to be compounded in the face of its exposure to Asia, 
particularly Hong Kong. 
11-17: South Korea abandons its defense of the battered won. 
11-18:The Financial Reform Bill fails to pass in the National Assembly in 
Korea.  
11-18: Malaysia’s infrastructure firm United Engineers (M) Bhd (UEM), 
one of a handful of blue chips favored by foreign investors for predictable   18
cash flows, says it had bought a 32.6 percent stake in debt-laden affiliate 
Renong Bhd. 
11-19: Japan’s prime minister denies that he is considering using public 
funds to help ailing banks, raising fears of massive bankruptcy. 
11-21: In Japan, Yamaichi Securities Co. said it is considering whether 
to close down, with a final decision planned for Monday. The company, 
one of Japan’s so-called “Big Four” securities houses, is facing severe 
financial problems and pressure from government regulators over newly 
discovered debts. 
*11-20: Stocks in Malaysia plunges on concern of more corporate 
bailouts of troubled companies by cash rich units.  
11-24: Troubled Tokyo brokerage Yamaichi Securities Co. Ltd., the 
fourth-largest in Japan, announces that it is closing its doors. 
11-25: Standard & Poor’s ratings agency on Tuesday lowers South 
Korea’s currency ratings because of its growing financial crisis and 
warns that current events could result in another downgrade in the next 
few months. 
12-01: Devastated by bankruptcies and debt defaults, several Korean 
commercial and merchant banks are on the brink of collapse. Korean 
and IMF officials continue to disagree on the details of the aid package. 
12:02: Director of Banking Supervision at Bank Indonesia, Budi Rohadi, 
is quoted as saying the government could not rule out liquidating more 
banks in an effort to improve the banking system. Standard & Poors   19
places the Indonesian power producer IPPs bonds and loans on credit 
watch. The credit watch placement reflects a potential shift in 
government support of the electricity company. 
12-03: Moody’s Investors Service put another group of Japanese banks 
under review for a possible downgrade. 
*12-06: The Halla group--Korea's 12th largest chaebol-- declares itself 
insolvent. 
*12-08: Malaysian government announces measures to avoid asking the 
IMF for help. 
12-08: Announcements are made of a Korean government takeover of a 
major bank and a merger in the ailing auto industry (Daewoo and 
Ssangyong Motor Co.) A U.S. economist reiterates concerns that last 
week’s record-breaking $57 billion bailout package for Korea organized 
by the International Monetary Fund would not be enough. 
12-09: Rumors that Indonesia’s President Suharto is gravely ill swept 
Southeast Asia.  
12-09: South Korea’s foreign-exchange reserves have run dangerously 
low, with its official reserves standing at $23.9 billion on Dec. 2, down 
from $30.5 billion at the end of October. 
12-11: Overnight, Moody’s Investors Service lowered South Korea’s 
foreign debt currency ceiling and downgraded the ratings of 31 Korean 
issuers. Standard & Poor’s cuts ratings on three South Korean financial 
institutions.   20
12-11: The Rating Agency Malaysia Bhd (RAM) says that it has 
downgraded bond issues guaranteed by Sanwa Bank and the Tokai 
Bank. 
*12-11: Poor economic outlook in the Philippines. 
*12-12: Suharto may have serious health problems. 
12-15: A possible freeze on Indonesian loan repayments raises concerns 
of a deepening financial crisis. 
12-15: The Philippines government challenges the markets by telling 
banks they could keep their money if they were not willing to lower 
interest rates. “We do not need that money if the rates are going to be so 
high,” assistant finance secretary Gil Beltran tells Reuters after the 
Bureau of Treasury rejected all bids at Monday’s auction. The rejection, 
which the Treasury last did two years ago, comes as a surprise because 
the state’s fiscal position is extremely shaky. 
*12-16: Stocks in the Philippines decline. 
12-18: Voters in South Korea elect longtime dissident Kim Dae-jung, the 
most critical candidate of the IMF bailout to serve a five-year term as 
president, leaving analysts’s concerned that the country’s financial 
markets will be further battered. 
12-19: The failure of a foodstuffs trader, Toshoku Ltd.—the fourth-largest 
bankruptcy in post-war Japan, renews concerns about the precarious 
state of the Japanese economy   21
12-22: Moody’s says it has downgraded the foreign currency ceiling for 
bonds and bank deposits of Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. It also 
downgrades Thailand’s foreign currency ceiling for bonds and confirmed 
the ceiling for bank deposits. 
*12-23: International credit rating agencies downgrade the Korea's 
foreign currency debt. 
12- 24: Some U.S. banks appear to be concerned about the ability of 
South Korean companies to repay their loans in the wake of the 
country’s ongoing financial crisis. 
*12-24: A research report from IndoSuez securities puts foreign debt at 
twice the Indonesian government forecast. 
12- 24: The outlook for Japan’s financial sector worsened Wednesday as 
Standard & Poor’s cut its ratings on two of that country’s major banks. 
0 1-02: Standard & Poor’s downgrades Indonesia’s sovereign ratings. 
0 1-05: Thailand announces that it would ask the International Monetary 
Fund to ease the terms of its $17.2 billion bailout package. 
*01-05: S&P cuts Malaysia's sovereign ratings.  
0 1-06: Indonesia announces its budget without a tough reform agenda 
and overly optimistic projections. 
01-07: Market reports that the IIMF is dissatisfied with the Indonesian 
reform effort raises fears that the second tranche of the IMF package 
would not be disbursed. 
*01-08: the IMF may withdraw its bailout package for Indonesia.   22
0 1-09: The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) is ordered to suspend 
construction of its gas pipeline in forest areas. 
*01-09: Fear that economy is headed for a recession in the Philippines. 
*01-12: Stocks fall on Indonesian financial problems amid concerns that 
loans to Indonesia may become bad debt. 
01-15: Bank Indonesia, the central bank, announces that it would raise 
interest rates on SBI (central bank) certificates across the entire 
spectrum of maturities, from overnight to one-year. 
01-21: Indonesian corporates are resorting to rupiah payments on U.S. 
dollar debt, while renewed political jitters added another broadside. 
01-21: Bankers in New York say overnight that efforts to restructure 
South Korea's debt burden may have grown more difficult with the 
country expected to reject any proposal to raise money through a large 
bond offering. 
01-22: Indonesia’s corporate debt is estimated at $65 billion. 
01-22: Vehicles sales in Malaysia are expected to drop by 60 percent this 
year. 
*02-04: Thailand stocks fall as investors concluded that prices were out 
of line with earning prospects. 
02-05: The Indonesian government has estimated that about 10 percent 
of its workforce of 90 million people will be unemployed by the end of the 
year.   23
02-06: The Japanese government declares the economy “stagnant” in a 
monthly report that offeres the darkest assessment of the country’s 
business climate in more than 20 years. 
02-10: Korean unions voice opposition to job losses and threaten 
possible strikes 
02-11: Riots break out to protest rising food prices in Indonesia. 
President Suharto warns that unknown “parties” are seeking to 
undermine the economy. 
02-12: IMF gives cool reception to Indonesia’s currency board ideas. 
*02-16: The Washington Post said IMF managing director Michel 
Camdessus had written to President Suharto expressing strong 
disapproval of the plan.   "In the present circumstances ... if a currency 
board proposal were adopted, we would not be able to recommend to the 
IMF Board the continuation of the current program because of the risks 
to the Indonesian economy," Camdessus said. 
02-20: Indonesian and US officials contradict each-other on the 
implementation of the currency board system. 
02-23: Rating Agency Malaysia (RAM) says on Monday it has downgraded 
Damansara Realty Bhd’s 300 million ringitt convertible redeemable 
guaranteed unsecured loan stocks to B 1 from BBB3. 
02-23: The G7 singles out Japan for criticism after a weekend meeting. 
“In Japan, activity is low and the outlook is weak,” a statement released 
after the meeting read.   24
02-25: New Korean premier sworn in, but opposition obstructs approval 
vote. 
03-02: New inflation figures suggest possibility of hyperinflation in 
Indonesia, as year-to-year rate hits 32 percent. 
03-04: Malaysia’s central bank says the blue chip Sime Dalby Bhd’s 
banking unit—one of the country’s top 10 banks—needs over a billion 
ringitt in fresh capital. It also says that the country’s second largest 
bank, government-run Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd, and two finance 
companies also may need capital injections. 
03-04: Central bank officials revealed that the Thailand Financial 
Institutions Development Fund had liabilities of 1.1 trillion baht as of 
mid-February, compared with just 36.2 billion baht in mid-1995. 
03-05: Currency board confusion continues as Indonesian authorities 
say that it was still part of the reform plan. Also an IMF review is delayed 
as reports say very little progress has been done on reforms. 
*03-05: Bank stocks fall on concern that losses of banks in Malaysia will 
be repeated across Asia. 
*03-09: Over the weekend news broke that the IMF, worried about the 
government's commitment to economic reform, would delay the 
disbursement of funds to Indonesia. 
03-11: Prosecutors raid the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and arrest one of its top 
officials.   25
03-12: Concerns are raised over the recapitalization requirements of 
some Thailand companies, following news that fixed line communications 
company Telecom Asia Plc would raise its registered capital through an 
issue of 777 million new shares, without announcing terms as yet. 
03-14: Indonesia’s President Suharto announces cabinet replete with 
cronies and relatives. 
03-20: In Japan, a huge derivatives trading loss is reported at health 
food maker Yakult Honsha Co. Ltd. 
03-27: The long awaited economic-stimulus package is announced in 
Japan, and it does not include tax cuts to bolster economic growth. 
03-30: Food riots spread through Indonesia. 
03-31 South Korea’s February industrial output showed negative annual 
growth for the second month in a row while February output was down 
1.9 percent on a year earlier. All indicators points to recession. 
04-02: Moody’s ratings on RHB Bank Bhd, essentially reflect the rating 
agency’s overly pessimistic views on the Malaysian economy and banking 
sector. 
04-02: Indonesia reports a trade surplus of $1.78 billion in January 
against $1.53 billion in December. But the rising surplus stemmed not 
from rising exports—which actually fell to $4.15 billion from December’s 
$4.70 billion—but from collapsing import. 
04-02: The release of a Bank of Japan survey indicates that corporate 
confidence in the Japanese economy had sunk to a dramatic low.   26
04-03: Moody’s Investors Service lowers its outlook on Japan’s sovereign 
debt rating. 
04-10: The much anticipated speech by Prime Minister Hashimoto on the 
economy of Japan falls short of expected reform announcements. 
04-15: A decline in industrial production in February and a rise in 
inflation to a five-year high in March show the Malaysian economy could 
slow down faster than expected. 
04-14: Indonesia’s much-heralded economic reforms programme suffers 
a set back after newspapers quote a senior cabinet minister as saying 
one of the measures agreed with the IMF may not be implemented. “This 
is the Republic of Indonesia here, this is not the IMF republic,” 
Republika newspaper quoted Trade and Industry Minister Mohamad 
“Bob” Hasan as saying. 
04-16: Kia Motors’ workers in Korea begin a strike. 
04-16: More news of corporate difficulties surface in Malaysia 
 
GOOD NEWS 
*07-04: Devaluation of the baht will revive economy 
*07-14: The IMF offers the Philippines almost $1.1 billion in financial 
support under fast-track regulations drawn up after the 1995 Mexican 
crisis 
07-17: The inflation outlook is stable for the Philippines.   27
07-29: In an uncharacteristically decisive move, Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance announces punishment of unprecedented severity for Nomura 
Securities and Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank for illegal payments. 
07-28: Thailand seeks IMF for a rescue package. 
08-05: Thailand unveils an austerity plan and complete revamp of 
finance sector as part of IMF suggested policies for a rescue package. 
*08-11 : The IMF unveils in Tokyo a rescue package for Thailand 
including loans totaling $16 billion from the IMF 
*08-16 : An unnamed Beijing source tells a local Hong Kong newspaper 
that China is prepared to use US$50 billion to defend the Hong Kong 
dollar. 
08-20: IMF approves a $3.9 billion credit for Thailand. 
08-27: The Central Bank of Japan announces that it will keep interest 
rates down to facilitate economic recovery. 
*09-04: The Indonesian government announces an economic reform 
package with a ten-point plan of austerity measures. 
*09-05: Malaysia takes steps to liberalize their equity markets. 
09-05: Malaysia’s PM Mahathir’s announces infrastructure spending will 
be slowed and that the recently imposed ban on short sales of shares 
would be lifted as of today. 
09-08: Malaysia’s central bank said on Monday that banking groups with 
at least two Tier-1 banks would be allowed to freely combine and 
rationalize their internal operations to improve efficiency.   28
*09-09: The Philippines central bank able to buy dollars in spot markets. 
*09-16: Indonesia says it will postpone projects worth 39 trillion rupiah. 
09-19: Koko Sato, Japanese politician once convicted in bribery scandal, 
but recently appointed to cabinet, suggests he will resign, thus defusing 
a political crisis for the Prime Minister. 
*09-19: Central bank lowers rates for reserve repurchase instruments in 
the Philippines. 
10-02: Thailand’s newly published inflation reports say pressure not too 
high. 
10-08: Indonesia says it will ask the IMF for financial assistance. 
*10-08: Malaysian Finance Minister says that the budget would restore 
the economy's health. 
*10-09: Borrowing cost come down as the Philippines central bank cuts 
the overnight borrowing rate. 
10-09: Thailand’s PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh is told by Japanese PM 
Ryutaro Hashimoto that Japan will extend $8 billion to Thailand as part 
of a trade and investment insurance scheme. 
10-31: The IMF announces a $23 billion multilateral financial package 
involving the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to help Indonesia 
stabilize its financial system. 
*11-03: Stocks soar in the wake of IMF rescue package and bank reform 
for Indonesia.    29
*11-03: Hong Kong saw some of the most dramatic gains, with the Hang 
Seng index rising 2.62 percent at the opening 
*11-04: Thai PM Chavalit announces that he will resign because he lost 
public confidence for his inability to implement to needed economic 
reforms. 
*11-08: Democratic Party leader Chuan Leekpai appointed PM of 
Thailand. 
11-11: South Korea’s Ministry of Finance and Economy announces that 
it plans to put forth all efforts to stabilize the country’s currency against 
the U.S. dollar by resolving concerns about financial market turmoil. 
Local newspapers, meanwhile, report that the government will soon 
announce a package of measures, which includes widening overseas 
borrowing by state-run corporations and a restructuring in merchant 
banks. 
11-14: South Korea’s majority party vows to pass a reform package it 
says will clean up debt-ridden banks. The proposed reform—the first of 
its kind in half a century—calls for a major shakeup of the nation’s 
banking industry to encourage foreign investors to return to South 
Korea. 
11-17: The failure of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the first of Japan’s 
big banks to collapse under the weight of bad loans, is the latest—and 
strongest—sign yet that the Japanese government is prepared to allow 
market forces to reconfigure the domestic financial landscape.   30
*11-20: Korean government widens trading band to shore up financial 
sector.  
11-21: South Korea said it would seek a rescue package from the 
International Monetary Fund. 
11-24: Malaysia’s solid export growth of 2 1.7 percent in September 
raises hopes that it will cushion the economic slowdown. 
11-27: The Bank of Japan and the Finance Ministry makes a rare 
statement of assurance to calm investors. Finance Minister Hiroshi 
Mitsuzuka states that no more financial failures are imminent after the 
Yamaichi failure. 
12-04: IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus signs a letter of intent 
on Wednesday covering an international accord to provide Korea with 
$57 billion to help dig it out of its financial mess. 
12-08: Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim set 
the new economic agenda Friday, announcing Malaysia’s most sweeping 
policy changes in a decade. Among other things, he pledges to slash 
government spending by 18 percent, curb big-ticket imports and restrict 
bank credits and stock-market fund raising. 
12-09: News is released that the Japanese government will issue 10 
trillion yen in new bonds to support the financial system. 
*12-15: Hopes of accelerated assistance from the IMF in Korea.   31
12-16: Following IMF guidelines, the Korean authorities announce to sell 
off two troubled banks and push forward with a $10 billion sovereign 
bond issue. 
12-17: Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan announces a special 
two trillion yen ($15.7 billion) cut in personal income taxes. 
*12-24: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States and 12 
other nations Wednesday pledged to speed $10 billion in bailout money 
to South Korea to support its embattled economy.  
12-30: A group of key U.S. and German banks agrees to help Korea 
manage its estimated $100 billion in short-term debt. The International 
Monetary Fund approves a $2 billion payment for troubled South Korea 
Tuesday, bringing IMF payments to more than $11 billion in just under a 
month. 
*01-02: In a plan being proposed by U.S. bank J.P. Morgan & Co., South 
Korea could convert its bank debt into government-issued bonds with 
various maturities, the Wall Street Journal said Friday.  
*01-06: The Philippines widen bands in which the currency can be 
traded. 
01-09: Expectations of some type of Indonesian debt accord intensifies 
following telephone conversations between U.S. President Bill Clinton 
and Asian leaders, and a new commitment from Indonesian President 
Suharto to implement economic reforms.   32
01-09: A proposal for the South Korean government to issue about $25 
billion in bonds to stem the country’s debt crisis wins increased support 
at a meeting of international banks. 
*01-12: the Korean government takes steps to ease a cash crunch. 
01-13: The IMF and Indonesia neared an agreement over the IMF bailout. 
US Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers leaves his meeting 
with Suharto by saying that Indonesia will implement its economic 
reform program “as soon as possible.” 
*01-14: the IMF announces reform package for Indonesia and Suharto 
commits to the IMF package. 
01-15: Indonesia’s Suharto signs an agreement, second in 4 months, 
with the IMF that requires him to dismantle the monopolies, and the 
family-owned businesses 
01-15: International banks agreed to roll-over much of Korea’s short-
term debt due by the end of March. 
01-16: Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan hints during a 
meeting of his ruling Liberal Democratic Party that the party may 
consider another round of tax cuts 
*01-16: International lenders on Friday officially completed a plan to roll 
over South Korean short-term debt through March 31 
*01-19: Korea was upgraded by international credit companies. 
*01-19: Michel Camdessus makes favorable comment about Malaysian 
economy.   33
*01-19: Optimism that the Philippines would be the 1st to emerge from 
the South East Asian crisis. 
0 1-26: Indonesia’s government and the country’s indebted companies 
hold talks with foreign bankers to resolve a huge corporate debt problem 
through a probable debt moratorium. A debt freeze proposal is also 
forwarded. 
*01-26: Korea's government negotiators close an agreement with 
international creditors to exchange $25billions of commercial bank debt 
for long term loans.  
*01-27: Indonesia announced new reforms Tuesday to restore confidence 
in its banking sector, guaranteeing commercial bank obligations and 
allowing overseas investment in local banks. 
0 1-28: South Korea’s government and global creditors agree to exchange 
about $24 billion of the Asian nation’s short-term debt for government-
guaranteed loans. 
*01-30: the Philippines stocks soar on investor confidence. 
*01-30: Thailand plans to lift currency controls.  
02-02: Bank of Thailand announces lifting of capital controls imposed 
last May to defend the baht. 
02-06: The International Finance Corporation and other banks agrees to 
provide $42 billion in credit for 42 domestic companies in Indonesia. 
Also, the government pledges to move quickly to set up a bankruptcy law 
in line with the International Monetary fund’s requirements.   34
02-09: Finance Ministry announced that it would complete the 
liberalization of South Korea’s financial markets to overseas investors. 
02-10: Group of Seven is considers establishing a $16 billion find to help 
stabilize regional currencies. President Suharto of Indonesia stresses 
currency stabilization measures. 
02-10: Relaxing a key condition, IMF says that it will allow Thailand to 
return a budget deficit of one to two percent of GDP in the year. In 
addition, the IMF will also allow Thailand to ease its high domestic 
interest rates. 
02-10: Philippines President Fidel Ramos on signs an amended oil 
deregulation law to meet the last condition for the country’s exit from 
International Monetary Fund tutelage. 
02-13 Union strikes in Korea are canceled. 
02-17: The IMF releases a further $2 billion to South Korea, bringing 
total IMF lending to about $15 billion so far out of its $21 billion Seoul 
rescue package. 
02-17: Malaysia’s central bank on reassures banks and finance 
companies that they do not face a hard-and-fast March 31 deadline to 
complete mandated mergers. 
*02-18: Standard  & Poor's upgraded Korea's debt  ratings. 
02-19: Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim says that there 
is no reason yet to revise downward the government’s four percent 
economic growth forecast for the current year.   35
*02-23:The Group of Seven industrialized nations Saturday urged Japan 
to continue to strengthen its financial system in order to spur its 
economy and said the outlook for Asian economies that pursue 
necessary reforms is generally positive. It added that as long as the 
affected Asian countries follow through with reform, and the rest of the 
world responds appropriately, the overall effect of the Asian crisis on 
world growth in 1998 should be manageable. 
02-26: Officials express optimism about the ability to deal with 
Indonesia’s $73 billion in private offshore borrowing. 
02-26: Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said the Japanese government 
will consider the possibility of bringing forward planned public works 
spending once the budget for next fiscal year is passed by parliament. 
02-27: The Korean opposition agrees to return to parliament, after three 
days of boycott. 
02-27: Malaysia raises the ceiling on foreign share ownership in 
telecommunications companies to 49 percent from 30 percent. 
03-02: A $3.29 billion trade surplus is reported for Korea in February, 
compared with a $2.12 billion deficit a year ago. 
03-10: In Indonesia, Suharto is reelected for a 7th term. 
03-12: Korea’s President Kim Dae-jung calls for a lifting of barriers on 
hostile mergers and acquisitions by foreigners. 
03-13: Korea’s international creditors had roll over $21.3 billion of shor- 
term debts.    36
03-13: The US compliments Thailand’s PM on taking the right  
reform measures in tackling the crises. 
03-13: Top financial and political leaders gather to convince Suharto to 
follow the IMF accord for Indonesia. 
*03-13: Sixth consecutive monthly trade surplus for Thailand. 
03-16: Korea’s debt rollover by foreign creditors are done over longer 
period than the shortest possible 1 year, thus signifying confidence in 
the economic future.  
*03-19: China's new premier, Zhu Rongji, said on Thursday that Beijing 
would defend the Hong Kong currency's link to the U.S. dollar at any 
cost.  
03-20: Indonesia shelves currency board plans. 
03-23: Hubert Neiss of IMF says “The IMF and the Indonesian 
government have made ‘considerable progress’ toward a new deal to 
counter the country’s grave economic crisis. 
03-25: The secretary-general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of 
Japan, Koichi Kato, hints at delaying legally mandated fiscal reforms, a 
move that would allow Tokyo to introduce bold economic steps in the 
future, including large tax cuts. 
04-06: Standard & Poor’s, in a statement issued in London, says the 
latest bank restructuring move in Indonesia is a “significant step” in the 
long-awaited consolidation of the banking industry.   37
04-08: Indonesia says that it has reached agreement with the IMF on a 
new package of economic reforms and targets, which the IMF would 
watch closely to ensure compliance 
04-09: For Korea, a successful $4 billion overseas bond sale takes place. 
04-20: Various reform measures under IMF auspices begins in 
Indonesia. 
04-23: Malaysia’s Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim gives a thumbs up to 
the resolution of a drawn-out banking merger between RHB Bank Bhd 
and Sime Bank Bhd 
Notes: * indicates different news or additional news, compared with the 
news used in Baig and Goldfajan's (1998) paper.  
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Figure 1. Exchange Rates Movement during the Asian Crisis Period 
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Table 1. Regression Results: Impact of Domestic News 
 
 
Regression Method : OLS 
Dependent Variable: Change in Nominal Exchange Rate 
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Table 2. Regression Results : Impact of Domestic News ( 0, 1, 2, 3 scheme) 
 
 
Regression Method : OLS 
Dependent Variable: Change in Nominal Exchange Rate 













































































































































































Notes: t statistics are in parenthesis. * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% 
significance level. 
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Table 3. Regression Results: Impact of Foreign News  
 
Regression Method : OLS 
Dependent Variable: Change in Nominal Exchange Rate 
  Korea  Philippines  Thailand  Indonesia  Malaysia 
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Thailand 









































































































































Notes: t statistics are in parenthesis. * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% 
significance level.   43
 